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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a-3 (2) (h) (Supp. 1990). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is based upon an order entered by the 
honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, Judge, Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, dismissing 
plaintiff/appellants complaint. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether plaintiffs/appellants have a recognizable 
interest in defendant's/appellee's child to permit 
intervention for adoption proceedings or grandparent 
visitation rights. 
I. Whether defendant's child was at any time 
parentless . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Annotated §78-30-4(1)(2) (Set forth in its entirety 
in the Addendum) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 26, 1989, the appellee gave birth to a baby 
girl. (R. at 103). The father of the child is David V. 
Kasper, son of plaintiff/appellants. On June 17, 1989, David 
V. Kasper, the father of the child, was killed in an 
automobile accident. David V. Kasper and appellee were net 
married at the time of his death. However, wedding 
announcements had been printed prior to David V. Rasper's 
death. On or about September 26, 1989, appellant filed a 
complaint with the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah 
County, requesting grandparental rights. (R. at 1). On 
September 27, 1989, appellee executed an affidavit and 
release, relinquishing her child to L.D.S. Social Services, a 
licensed child placement agency, for adoptive placement. The 
child has since been placed by L.D.S. Social Services in an 
adoptive home. (R. at 103) Appellee filed a motion to 
dismiss on or about October 10, 1989. (R. at 6). Both 
parties submitted memoranda of points and authorities and 
upon entertaining oral arguments, Judge Cullen Y. Christensen 
took the matter under advisement and orally requested further 
research and memoranda on the issue of whether or not the 
subject child was ever "parentless." (R. at 80). Having 
considered the memoranda and matters outside the pleadings, 
and pursuant to Rules 12(b) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Judge Christensen granted appellee's motion and 
dismissed the case with prejudice on May 8, 1990, (R. at 106) 
stating that the child was at no time parentless. (R. at 
104). The appellant's, Ruby L. Kasper and David Kasper, 
appeal from the decision of the trial court. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
When defendant released her child to the LDS Social 
Services she gave up her rights to the child. U.C.A. §78-30-
4 provides a parent with the option to release her child to a 
licensed child placement agency. However, U.C.A. §78-30-4 
does not provide a parent with the option of revoking the 
release once it is signed except in situations of fraud, 
duress and undue influence. Defendant signed the release of 
her child by her own free will and with the intent to 
terminate her parental responsibilities. Defendant further 
intended that the child be adopted. Therefore, defendant had 
no rights to the child once she signed the release. As a 
matter of law, the child became parentless once defendant 
signed the release and the child was in the the care of LDS 
Social Services . 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Wilson v. Family Services 
Division, 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976) recognizes that 
grandparents have an interest in their grandchildren for the 
sole reason of their biological connection. The court stated 
that grandparents can exercise their interest in the child if 
the child were "parentless." Appellee would have this court 
believe that a child becomes parentless only if the parental 
rights are judicially terminated or the parents of the child 
are deceased. Appellants believes that there is no Utah 
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statutory or case law to support this conclusion. Although 
Appellants agree that a child is parentless when the parental 
rights are judicially terminated and upon the death of 
parents, appellants also believe that a child becomes 
parentless if a parent: releases his or her right in the child 
to a child placing agency for the purpose of adoption. In 
Wilson the mother of the subject child did not have her 
parental rights judicially terminated but rather she 
voluntarily relinquished her rights in the child to a 
licensed child placing agency. "[I]n connection with the 
proceeding, [the mother] had agreed to surrender and disclaim 
rights to [the child's] custody. Pursuant thereto, the 
juvenile court ordered that [the child] be placed with the 
defendant Family Services for the purpose of placing him for 
adoption." Jji. at 228 (emphasis added). The mother was not 
before the court to have her parental rights terminated but 
rather agreed to do so during the hearing. In contrast to 
Appellee's argument and position, the mother in Wilson first, 
did not have her parental rights judicially terminated and 
second, she was living at the time. The mother in Wilson 
would not fall into the category that the appellee purposes 
to this court. Appellant's position is that the appellee in 
this case like the mother in Wilson did not have her parental 
rights judicially terminated however, her rights have been 
effectively terminated by the signing of a release. 
U.C.A. §78-30-4(1) states in relevent part that: 
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A child cannot be adopted without the consent of 
each living parent having rights in relation to 
said child, except... whenever it shall appear that 
the parent or parents who consent would otherwise 
be required have theretofore, in writing, 
acknowledged before any officer authorized to take 
acknowledgments, released his or her or their 
control or custody of such child to any agency 
licensed to receive children for placement or 
adoption... and such agency consents, in writing, 
to such adoption... 
It appears that if a parent has his/her rights judicially 
terminated or if a parent signs a release before one 
authorized to take releases, the effect is the same. In the 
case of a parent releasing a child to a child placing agency, 
a parent signs a release (or affidavit) terminating his/her 
right to the child. The adoption agency then acquires the 
responsibility for the care and well being of the child as 
well as the responsibility of finding the best adoptive home 
home possible. The agency then must consent to the adoption. 
Under this same scenario, the parent is not required to 
consent a second time before a judge to have their parental 
rights terminated, or consent a second time to the release of 
his/her child to the adoption agency, or consent to the 
adoption. The adoption agency consents to the adoption by 
showing the judge the signed release (or affidavit) which 
manifests that the parental rights have been terminated. The 
adoption agency must then consent to the adoption. 
Appellee in this case contends that she still has some 
parental interest in the child even though she has signed a 
release wherein she relinquished her rights to the child to a 
licensed child placing agency. It appears that appellee also 
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i s i m p l y i n g t h a t i f she so d e s i r e d , she c o u l d a g a i n have he r 
p a r e n t a l r i g h t s r e i n s t a t e d and have f u l l c u s t o d y r i g h t s t o 
t h e c h i l d . T h i s i s s i m p l y not so f o r two r e a s o n s . F i r s t , i t 
h a s n e v e r been t h e c o n t e n t i o n of d e f e n d a n t t h a t she may have 
o r c o u l d have h e r p a r e n t a l r i g h t s r e i n s t a t e d o r have c u s t o d y 
of t h e c h i l d . (See A f f i d a v i t of B e v e r l y Edwards s e t f o r t h in 
f u l l i n t h e a d d e n d u m ) . 1 Second, i t i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d i n 
Utah c a s e law t h a t once a r e l e a s e / c o n s e n t t o a d o p t i o n i s 
s i g n e d , t h a t a p a r e n t c anno t revoke t h e r e l e a s e f o r any 
r e a s o n u n l e s s i t i s shown t h a t t h e r e l e a s e was s i g n e d u n d e r 
d u r e s s , f r a u d o r undue i n f l u e n c e . I t i s c l e a r t h a t once a 
r e l e a s e i s s i g n e d , i t i s f i n a l i f t h a t r e l e a s e was s i g n e d 
w i l l i n g l y . See f M a t t e r of Sf 572 P .2d 1370 (Utah 1 9 7 7 ) , 
M a t t e r of Adop t ion of I n f a n t Anonymous, 760 P . 2 d 916 (Utah 
App. 1 9 8 8 ) . I t i s a l s o c l e a r t h a t d e f e n d a n t s i g n e d t h e 
r e l e a s e w i l l i n g l y and by h e r own f r e e w i l l w i t h t h e i n t e n t t o 
t e r m i n a t e h e r r i g h t s . She a l s o i n t e n d e d t h a t t h e c h i l d be 
p l a c e d w i t h a l i c e n s e d c h i l d p l a c i n g agency f o r t h e p u r p o s e 
of a d o p t i o n . The* a p p e l l e e does admit t h a t s e c t i o n 78 -30 -4 
(1) a u t h o r i z e s a p a r e n t t o t r a n s f e r c u s t o d y and p a r e n t a l 
r i g h t s t o an a d o p t i o n agency f o r t h e p u r p o s e of f u t u r e 
^Nearly t h r e e months a f t e r a p p e l l e e s igned an a f f i d a v i t r e l e a s i n g her 
r i g h t s and cus tody in t h e c h i l d t o L.D.S. Soc i a l Se rv ices and n e a r l y 
t h r e e months a f t e r t h e commencement of t h i s a c t i o n , a p p e l l e e f i l e d 
ano the r a f f i d a v i t t o suppor t arguments r a i s e d in her r ep ly memorandum 
which a p p a r e n t l y c o n t r a d i c t s t h e f i r s t a f f i d a v i t t h a t she s i g n e d . I t 
appears t h a t i f a p p e l l a n t i s g ran ted a hea r ing r ega rd ing t h e i r f i t n e s s 
as adop t ive p a r e n t s , t hen a p p e l l e e in t ends t o revoke her r e l e a s e and 
t a k e t h e c h i l d back and r a i s e t h e c h i l d h e r s e l f . P l ease see A f f i d a v i t 
of J e n n i f e r Nord fe l t d a t e d December 7, 198 9, s e t f o r t h in f u l l i n t he 
addendum and compare wi th Af f idav i t of Beverely Edwards a l s o s e t f o r t h 
i n f u l l i n t h e addendum. 
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adoption. (See Br. of Appellee at 12.) However, defendant 
also argues that her parental rights have not yet been 
terminated even though those same parental rights have been 
released by the parent and transferred to the adoption 
agency. Defendant goes on the argue that although her 
parental rights have been released, she still has parental 
rights until the judge signs the adoption order. This 
argument is not reasonable, contradicts the above cited cases 
and would create an enormous amount of litigation. How can 
rights be released yet not released at the same time? 
Appellee has no intention of revoking her release and it is 
clear from the affidavits that the defendant had every 
intention of terminating her parental rights at the time she 
signed the release and wished to disengage herself from any 
further proceedings regarding the child. 
Appellee correctly states in her brief that there is no 
Utah case law on point. The cases from other jurisdictions 
that appellee did cite are also not on point. The facts of 
this case are unique and appellants believe that Wilson 
should be controlling in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee's child was parentless when appellee signed the 
release and relinquished her rights to the child the day 
after the child was born. The fact that the child was 
7 
parentless gives appellants the right to a hearing do 
determine whether or not they could be fit adoptive parents 
L2J DATED t h i s day of March, 1991. 
Michael J. P 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Beverly Edwards, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
1. I am a resident of the State of Utah. 
2. I am an employee of LDS Social Services, a child-
placement agency licensed by the State of Utah to receive 
children for placement or adoption. 
3. In connection with my employment with LDS Social 
Services, I provided counseling to Jennifer Nordfeld. Jennifer 
was 16 years old when she became pregnant- She was not married 
at the time she became pregnant and was not married at any time 
during her pregnancy. 
4. When Jennifer came to me for counseling, Jennifer 
and I discussed the options of her keeping and raising her 
child or placing her child for adoption. 
5. Jennifer expressed her feelings to me that she 
wanted to do what was in the childfs best interests. She 
advised me that she felt that it was in the child's best 
interest for the child to be placed in an adoptive home. 
Jennifer also expressed her feelings that it was extremely 
important for her and, in her opinion, for the child that the 
adoptive placement be confidential and anonymous. 
6. On September 26, 1989 Jennifer delivered a baby 
girl. 
7. On September 27,,1989, Jennifer executed an 
Affidavit and Release and relinquished her child to LDS Social 
Services for adoptive placement. A true and correct copy of 
the Affidavit and Release is attached hereto. 
8. Following Jennifer's relinquishment of her child 
to LDS Social Services, the child was placed in an adoptive 
home. 
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9. Prior to placing the child for adoption, LDS 
Social Services contacted the Registrar of Vital Statistics for 
the State of Utah and determined that no putative father had 
registered his paternity of Jennifer's baby. 
DATED this 10th day of October, 1989. 
Beverly Edwards 
Subscribed and sworn to this day of October, 
1989. 
Notary Public 
Residing at _ 
My Commission Expires: 
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STATE OF MONTANA ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF CASCADE ) 
Jennifer Nordfelt, being first duly sworn/ deposes 
and says: 
1. I an the mother of a child who was born out of 
wedlock on September 26, 1989, and I am the defendant in the 
above-entitled action. 
2. I became pregnant while I was living in Germany 
with my family. I was 16 years old when I became pregnant. I 
an now 17 years old. 
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3. After I became pregnant, David Kasper and I 
discussed the possibility of carriage. I moved from Germany to 
American Fork, Utah, so that I could complete high school and 
have some tiro* to be by myself to decide whether or not I 
should marry David Kasper or whether I should raise my child 
alone or place my child with an adoptive family• 
4. David Kasper and I agreed that he would come to 
American Fork, Utah, in June of 1989 so that we could spend 
some time together and evaluate our feelings to see if we both 
felt that we should be married* It was important to me in my 
decision regarding whether or net to marry David to determine 
if David Kasper was committed not to use alcohol or drugs* 
Wedding announcements were printed early because they were very 
inexpensive ($25.00) and so that if we finalized our decision 
regarding marriage, we could be married without additional 
delay* Marriage announcements were not mailed to anyone 
because a final decision regarding marriage had not been made* 
5. David Kasper and I were not able to spend time 
together to evaluate our feelings because he was killed in an 
automobile accident in Germany on June 17, 1989. At the time 
of the accident he was determined to be under the influence of 
alcohol. 
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6i On September 27f 1989,. I signed a document which 
authorized LDS Social Services to place my child for adoption* 
The decision to place my child for adoption was the most 
difficult decision I have ever had to make. Prior to making 
this decision, 1 had several counseling sessions with LDS 
Social Services and I also participated in group sessions with 
girls who had been faced with the same question* 
In I love my child very much and after weighing the 
issues as carefully as I couldf I decided that it would be in 
my child's best interests to be raised by two loving parents in 
an adoptive home. 
8. It is very important for me that my child be 
raised by parents who are active members of The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints and who will take my child to the 
temple. 
9. it is also very important for me and for my child 
that the adoption be anonymous and confidential* 
10. I hav© been told by LDS Social Services that the 
home where my child has been placed meets all of my dssires. 
11. If for any reason the court will not allow me to 
place my child in an adoptive home on a confidential basis and 
with a family that meets all of the requirements that I feel 
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are so important, I believe it would then be in my child's best 
interest to be raised by me and I intend to raise my child. 
12. Prior to placing my child for adoption, I had 
several discussions regarding adoption with David Kasper's 
parents, KU£>y ana Davia rasper. I tola them on several 
occasions that I intended to place lay child for adoption. 
13. Ruby Kasper told roe that she did not want me to 
place my child for adoption but that she would "respect what-
ever decision you'll [I] make." 
14. I have never told Ruby Kasper that if adoption 
were ever considered that she would receive custody of my 
child. 
15. I have never told Mary Kasper that roy child 
would be part of her life. 
16. Ruby and David Kasper did give me $455 which 
they had received from other relatives to pay for my airline 
ticket when I attended their son's funeral. 
16. Mr. and Mrs. Kasper have not provided me with 
any other financial assistance. 
DATED this 4^ day of December, 1989. 
Jennifer Nordffelt 
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Af f idav i t of Jenn i fer NordfeLt 
Subscribed and sworn t o t h i s £6tday of D e c k e r , 
1989 . 
Notary P u b l i c / ^ 
Residing a t ' "~ 7 ^ ^ ; ^ 
My Commission Expi res : 
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